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Abstract This paper studies the dynamic construction of a blockchain by5
competitive miners. In contrast to the literature, we assume a finite time6
horizon. Moreover, miners are rewarded for blocks that eventually become7
part of the longest chain. It is shown that popular mining strategies such8
as adherence to conservative mining or to the longest-chain rule constitute9
pure-strategy Nash equilibria. However, these equilibria are not subgame10
perfect.11
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1 Introduction19
Since the introduction of the bitcoin consensus protocol by Nakamoto (2009),20
blockchains have fascinated scholars from a variety of disciplines. The game-21
theoretic analysis of dynamic consensus protocols has, consequently, gained22
substantial momentum over the last decade. In an important recent contribu-23
tion, Biais et al. (2019) proposed modeling the construction of a blockchain24
as a stochastic game in continuous time with infinite horizon and possibly25
incomplete information. Their sophisticated framework allows a wealth of26
interesting conclusions. Here, we will try a related, but more elementary27
analysis.28
Specifically, in this paper, we model the construction of a blockchain as an29
extensive-form game with finite time horizon T . In each stage, the population30
of n miners (or mining pools) strives to append the respective next block to31
the existing blockchain. Thus, starting from the so-called genesis block, the32
blockchain develops in a stochastic manner. Miners are assumed to earn33
one token for any block that is contained in the longest chain at the end of34
the game.1 Now, being able to choose a parent block at libitum, miners may35
intentionally try to create forks. A conservative miner always appends any36
new block to the original chain, i.e., to the chain that contains the first child37
block, thereof the first child block, and so on. We also consider the class of38
mining strategies that follow the longest-chain rule, i.e., that append any39
new block to one of the longest chains in the blockchain. We confirm that40
conservative mining and, in fact, any combination of strategies consistent41
1Should there be more than one longest chain at the end of the game, one such chain
is chosen randomly.
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with the longest-chain rule, form Pareto effi cient Nash equilibria. However,42
we also show that, under the assumptions made below, these equilibria are43
not subgame perfect (Selten, 1965). This contrasts with findings of the recent44
literature that has found such strategies to be consistent even with the more45
restrictive concept of Markov perfect equilibrium.46
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls the formal47
definition of a blockchain. Section 3 introduces finite blockchain games. We48
establish the Nash equilibrium property of conservative mining and longest-49
chain mining in Section 4. Section 5 establishes the lack of subgame perfec-50
tion. Section 6 concludes.51
2 Formal model of the blockchain52
Suppose there are n ≥ 2 miners, collected in a set N = {1, ..., n}. We will53
use the following model of a blockchain (cf. Biais et al., 2019).54
Definition 1. A blockchain B consists of55
(i) a sequence of blocks B = {b0, b1, ..., bT}, where T ≥ 0;56
(ii) a parent-child relation W on B;57
(iii) an assignment map ι : B\{b0} → N .58
Thus, a blockchain B consists of (T +1) blocks, where T is the time horizon.59
The block b0 is referred to as the genesis block. Any two blocks may be60
related to each other by a parent-child relationship. Finally, each block except61
the genesis block has a miner assigned to it. An example of a blockchain is62
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shown in Figure 1. The numbers close to the circles are the respective miner63
assignments.64
65
Figure 1. A blockchain66
We will impose the following two additional requirements:67
(a) each block except the genesis block b0 has precisely one parent, i.e., for68
any t′ > 0, there is precisely one t such that bt W bt′69
(b) the parent has a lower index than the child, i.e., bt W bt′ implies t < t′.70
Popular mining strategies are based on the notion of a chain. A chain of71
length K ≥ 1 in the blockchain B is a set C = {b(0), . . . , b(K)} such that72
b(k−1) W b(k) for k = 1, . . . , K. The original chain starts at b0 and, if there73
is more than one child to a given parent, continues with the child with the74
lowest index. E.g., in the example shown in Figure 1, the original chain is75
Corg = {b0, b1, b2, b4}. A longest chain is a chain in blockchain B for which76
K is maximal. Clearly, any longest chain starts at b0. If a longest chain is77
unique, it is referred to as the longest chain in B. In the example shown78
in Figure 1, there are two longest chains, viz. C1 = {b0, b1, b3, b6, b7} and79
C2 = {b0, b1, b2, b5, b8}.80
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3 Finite blockchain games81
Suppose the n miners incrementally construct a blockchain B by interacting82
over T ≥ 1 stages. We denote the intermediate blockchains as B0,B1, . . . ,BT .83
At the start of the game, B0 consists only of the genesis block, so that84
B0 = {b0}, and both W0 and ι0 are empty. Next, at any intermediate stage85
t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, Bt is constructed from the existing blockchain Bt−1 as86
follows. Each miner i ∈ N selects a block b̂t−1(i) ∈ Bt−1 from the existing87
set of blocksBt−1. Then, a fair random draw selects the winning miner i∗t ∈ N88
of stage t.2 The new block bt is assigned to i∗t . Moreover, it is appended as a89
child to the block b̂t−1(i∗t ) chosen by the winning miner. Figure 2 illustrates90
the incremental build-up process of the blockchain.91
92
Figure 2. Blockchain construction93
2The random draw may be understood as a reduced form of the equilibrium in a static
model of mining competition such as Dimitri (2017).
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Miners’payoffs are determined as follows. After stage T , one of the longest94
chains C in the blockchain BT is drawn with equal probability. Each miner95
i ∈ N receives one token for each block b ∈ C\{b0} assigned to her. Miners96
are risk-neutral and maximize the expected number of tokens they receive.97
The stochastic game introduced above will be referred to as a finite98
n-miner blockchain game. Note that, given the possibility of forking99
and orphan blocks, the game is not constant-sum, i.e., there are gains from100
coordination.101
4 Mining strategies102
As the action space of the miners is expanding over time, there is an abun-103
dance of pure strategies in the extensive form. Two popular mining strate-104
gies, however, are easy to describe. We say that miner i is conservative if105
she always chooses the last block of the original chain. Further, we say that106
miner i follows the longest-chain rule if she always chooses the last block107
of one of the longest chains. Note that the longest-chain rule is a class of108
strategies, rather than a single strategy.109
We start by studying Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950). The following result110
says that conservative mining, and likewise following the longest-chain rule,111
constitute Nash equilibria in pure strategies.112
Proposition 1. Conservative mining constitutes a symmetric Nash equi-113
librium. Similarly, any profile of strategies consistent with the longest chain114
rule constitutes a Nash equilibrium.115
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Proof. (Conservative mining) Suppose that all miners j ∈ N\{i} are con-116
servative. We have to show that miner i has no strict incentive to deviate117
from conservative mining. Assume first that i adheres to the candidate equi-118
librium strategy. Then, the blockchain develops into a single chain consisting119
of (T + 1) blocks, and miner i receives one token for each block she mined.120
Assume, instead, that miner i deviates and works, at some stage t, on a block121
that is not the last block of the original chain. Then, miner i creates a fork122
when she wins that stage, i.e., with positive probability. As a result, she does123
not necessarily receive one token for each block that she mined. Thus, miner124
i potentially lowers, but never raises her payoff. Therefore, a deviation from125
conservative mining can never lead to a strictly higher expected payoff for126
miner i. (Longest-chain mining) The proof is entirely analogous and, hence,127
omitted. 128
5 Lack of subgame perfection129
In this section, it will be shown using two examples that the considered Nash130
equilibria need not constitute a subgame-perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1965).131
We begin with the conservative mining equilibrium.132
Example 1. (Conservative mining) Consider a blockchain game with133
n = 2 miners and T = 3 stages. Figure 3 shows a possible state of the134
blockchain B2, i.e., at the end of stage 2.135
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136
Figure 3. Conservative mining is not subgame-perfect137
In this example, miner 1 deviated from the conservative mining strategy138
in stage 2, mining on b0 rather than b1. Thus, we are at a subgame that139
cannot be reached if all miners followed their candidate equilibrium strategy.140
Now, at the outset of stage T = 3, the last block of the original chain is b1.141
However, it is optimal here for miner 1 to work on b2 because this allows her,142
with probability 1/2, to realize a token for the block b2.143
Thus, conservative mining is not subgame-perfect. But neither is the longest-144
chain rule, as the next example shows.145
Example 2. (Longest-chain rule) Consider a blockchain game with n = 3146
miners and horizon T = 6. Figure 4 shows a state of the blockchain B5, i.e.,147
at the end of stage 5. The fork implies that we are, again, off the equilibrium148
path. In the final stage T = 6, miner i = 1 would work on b3, because this149
allows her to win three tokens with probability 1/2 (in case she wins the last150
stage). In contrast, working on b5 and thereby following the longest-chain151
rule would allow her to win one token with probability one (in case she wins152
the last stage), which is strictly less in expectation. Thus, in the considered153




Figure 4. The longest-chain rule is not subgame-perfect.157
It should be clear that these examples are not exceptional, but represent158
a more general problem. In particular, it is not diffi cult to construct, in159
both cases, similar examples with an arbitrarily long (but not shorter) time160
horizon.161
Usually, the lack of subgame perfection is associated with the concept of a162
non-credible threat. This lack of credibility is particularly evident in the case163
of conservative mining. Indeed, there is intuitively little value in following164
the original chain once a fork has developed into a much longer chain. As165
our analysis has shown, the same lack of credibility is also present, but less166
evident, in the case of the longest-chain rule.167
6 Concluding remarks168
Under the assumptions on timing and payoffs used by Biais et al. (2019),169
conservative mining constitutes a subgame-perfect (and even Markov perfect)170
equilibrium in which players follow the longest-chain rule on the equilibrium171
path.3 Given that we heralded our framework as a simplified version of Biais172
et al. (2019), some discussion seems warranted.173
One possible explanation lies in the different assumptions on timing.174
3For example, in our Example 2, all miners working on block b5, respectively, would be
part of a subgame-perfect equilibrium under the assumptions of Biais et al. (2019).
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Indeed, Biais et al. (2019) assumed an infinite horizon, with individual min-175
ers being forced to exit at Poisson stopping times. In contrast, our model176
assumes a finite horizon.4 A second possible explanation lies in the differ-177
ent assumptions on payoffs. Specifically, Biais et al. (2019) assumed that178
miners receive, for each block they have solved, a reward equal to G(k),179
where k denotes the number of miners active, at the miner’s exit time, on180
the branch that contains the block. Importantly, Biais et al. (2019) assumed181
G(0) = G(1) = 0. Thus, blocks in orphan branches, on which no miner (or182
only one miner) is active, are worthless. In contrast, we assume that miners183
receive rewards for blocks mined on the longest chain at the end of the game.184
As shown above, these differences in assumptions do have an impact on the185
analysis of profitable deviations off the equilibrium path. Unfortunately,186
however, the precise way in which this happens is not easy to disentangle on187
a purely analytical basis.188
On a more intuitive level, however, both models capture the interplay189
between the coordination problem between the miners and the problem190
of vested interests. Moreover, while the assumptions used by Biais et al.191
(2019) give more weight to the coordination problem, our assumptions give192
more weight to the problem of vested interests. For instance, in Example 2,193
the assumptions in Biais et al. (2019) would intuitively allow miner 1 to give194
up her prior investments. In contrast, our assumptions would let miner 1 try195
to realize a yield from her earlier investments. As a result of this stronger196
emphasis of the problem of vested interests, conservative mining is less likely197
4If the two models differed only in the length of the time horizon, this would imply a
discontinuity in the subgame-perfect equilibrium correspondence, just as known from the
theory of repeated games.
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to satisfy the assumptions of subgame perfection off the equilibrium path in198
our model than in Biais et al. (2019).5199
Finally, we compare our findings to Eyal and Sirer’s (2018) decision-200
theoretic analysis of a rational miner interacting with a population of naïve201
miners. They pointed out that selfish mining, i.e., withholding one or202
several blocks, may dominate naïve longest-chain mining because it allows203
the rational miner to bias the mining contest for later blocks in her favor. In204
our model, there is no possibility for mining in secrecy, so that the approaches205
differ in at least one important dimension. Notwithstanding, selfish mining206
clearly seems related to the issues discussed in the present paper, and having207
a unifying framework would obviously be quite valuable.208
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